It is a well observed fact that markets follow both positive and/or negative trends, crashes and bubble effects. In general a strong positive trend is followed by a crash-a famous example of these effects was seen in the recent crash on the NASDAQ (april 2000) and prior to the crash in the Hong Kong market, which was associated with the Asian crisis in the early 1994. In this paper we use real market data coupled into a minority game with different payoff functions to study the dynamics and the location of financial bubbles.
INTRODUCTION

One of the biggest problems with models used in economics and finance is that the relevant features of the market dynamics are sometimes buried under so many parameters that a systematic understanding is almost impossible. This is mainly because the market mechanisms are intrinsically non-linear and complex, which means small variations in any of the parameters could lead to dramatic changes-thus making it difficult to track cause and effect.
To get around this problem physicists usually proceed in constructing models that start from the simplest model, capturing the essential features in question and progressively adding complexities to it. A famous example of this is the Ising model that tries to describe the magnetization in materials.
It is in this spirit that led most agent-based model creators to develop the concept of the Minority Game, which was originally defined by
1 This model aims at creating a simple but yet rich platform for exploring various phenomena arising from financial markets. 
THE MINORITY GAME
The model
M is the total number of choices.
Similar results may be obtained when one considers the case when there is a nonlinear dependence on A(t) i.e. with the dynamics U s,i (t + 1) = U s,i (t) − a µ(t) si(t),i sgn [A(t)], where sgn is the usual sign function taking ±1 when A(t) > 0 or A(t) < 0 respectively. This leads to qualitatively similar results.
A more lengthy discussion may be found elsewhere.
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The source of randomness is in the choice of µ(t) and by s i (t). These are fast fluctuating degrees of freedom. As a consequence U s,i (t) is also fast fluctuating and hence the probability with which the agents choose s i (t) are subject to stochastic fluctuations.
The key parameter is the ratio α = P/N and the two relevant quantities are Fig. 1 . From the graph we can see that the system undergoes a phase transition. Another thing that is worth noting is that the transition point moves according to the minimum shown in the global efficiency graph, Fig. 1, when the number of choices, S, is changed. 
The dollar game
The minority game is a repeated game where agents, N of them, have to choose one out of two possible alternatives at each step. Each agent, i, has a memory of the past. 
At each time step t every agent decides whether to buy or sell an asset. The agent takes an action a i (t) = ±1 where 1 is when buying an asset as opposed to -1 when selling. The excess demand A(t) at time t is then given by A(t) =
N i=1 a µ(t) si(t),i . The payoff of agent i in the Minority Game is given g i (t) = −a µ(t) si(t),i A(t). In order to model financial markets, some authors 7, 8 have used the following definition for the return r(t) using the price time series P (t), that is r(t) ≡ ln[P (t)] − ln[P (t − 1)] =
A(t) λ , which means that price time series is defined by,
P (t) = P (t − 1) exp A(t) λ .(2)
Here the liquidity λ is proportional to the number of agents N . In the minority game the agents predicts the price movements only over the next time step. However, Andersen and Sornette 9 have shown that in order to know when the price reaches its next local extremum and with optimized gain, the agents need to estimate the price movement over the next two time steps ahead (t and t + 1) and they therefore have postulated the correct payoff function to be given by
g $ i (t + 1) = a i (t)A(t + 1).(3)
This modification of the minority game is what is called the dollar game ($-Game).
THE PRICE FUNCTION IN THE MINORITY GAME WITH REAL DATA
si(t),i . If the price goes down then this variable takes the value of -1 else +1. This information is then used to update the value of the history µ(t), i.e. the history update is implimeneted via µ(t + 1) = [2µ(t) + sgn[A(t)]/2]mod P.
We also introduce an extra parameter that looks over a certain time in the past, we call it T . It can be understood as a window parameter of a given length. Fig. 2 we show As a final test we turn off the dynamics of both games by setting the score updates to 0, i.e. U s,i (t + 1) = U s,i (t) = 0, so that the scores do not get updated, and see how the game performs on real data, namely on the Nasdaq. This is shown in Fig. 3 .
Using this window parameter we can compare the dynamics of both games. In
In Fig. 3 , we can see that the dynamics of the MG with the $-Game clearly follow the market data, however this has little benefit because since the scores are not being updated reducing the choices to a coin flip. This makes the MG just follow the path of the real data without really picking up the real dynamics of the market. This is something that will need to be explored further in later works.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that it may be possible to use agent-based models such as the minority game for studying bubbles and crashes. This paper does not give a prescription on how to detect bubbles, this will be 
